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CHAPTER 4

Procedures for the Enforcement of New
York Convention Awards
George A. Bennann

§4.01

ARTICLE 111 ENFORCEMENT AND RELATED PROCEDURAL
ISSUES

Article III of the New York Conven�on expresses the Contracting States· core obligation
under the Convention, na[..nely the obligation to enforce Convention awards, absent a
basis in the Convention for declining to do so. At the same time, the Convention
drafters chose not to prescribe the manner in which such enforcement should take
place. Article III expressly reserved the .matter to the law of the place where enforce
ment under the Conv:=n:tion is sough,t/,
Enforcement was to be achieved "in accordance with the rules of procedure of the
territory where the award is relied upon." The only limitations on the freedom of
Contracting States in this regard is that they may not impose "substantially more
onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of
arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition
or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards. "1
Article III raises two fundamental questions. The first is simply a matter of treaty
construction. What rules qualify as "rules of procedure" for Article III purposes? The

1. An interesting analogy can be drawn between this limitation on national courts' application of
their procedural rules to Convention enforcement actions and the European Union's doctrine of
equivalence as a limit on procedural autonomy, under which "the types of procedures for actions
aimed at guaranteeing the protection of the recognized rights of individuals by EU norms cannot
be less favorable than those for similar actions in the domestic procedural system." Diana-Urania
Galetta, PROCEDURAL AUTONOMY OF EU MEMBER STATES: PARADISE LOST?: A Sll.lDY ON THE "FUNCTION
ALlZED PROCEDURAL COMPETENCE" OF EU �ER STATES 24 (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010).
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second and related question is precisely what limits, if any, does the Convention
impose on Contracting States in the exercise of their procedural latitude under Article
III.

[A]

What Is a "Rule of Procedure" under Article IIH

In examining the first of these questions-what is a "rule of procedure" for Article III
purposes?-it has become important to draw a distinction between rules of a procedural character that govern the question of "how" enforcement is to be conducted, on
the one hand, and rules of a procedural character that effectively determine ''whether"
enforcement is to be had at all, on the other.
According to one view, rules applicable to actions to enforce Convention awards
are to be understood as only those addressing the manner in which such actions are to
proceed. Such rules, by way of example, would readily include those addressing the
scope, length or timing of responsive pleadings or -the availability of document
discovery. Questions of privilege would also fall into this category, as would rules of
evidence more generally. There can be little doubt that such rules, which determine
how an enforcement action shall proceed, qualify as procedural. Such "how" rules
assume that an enforcement action will go forward, and simply determine the
modalities by which it does so. By virtue of Article III, they are not provided for by the
Convention and are instead supplied exclusively by national law.
However, the notion of procedural rules under Article III may be conceived of
more broadly, to include all rules applicable to an enforcement action other than those
that address the merits of the enforcement action, understood as the determination of
whether an award is or is not entitled to be enforced. This view rests largely on a binary
distinction between "substance" and "procedure," the former governing the merit~ of
an enforcement action and the latter governing all non-merits issues. So viewed,
procedural rules would not be confined to those governing how an enforcement action
shall proceed, but also whether it shall proceed because the latter, like the former, steer
clear of the enforcement action's merits. Among rules determining whether an
enforcement action shall proceed include those defining judicial jurisdiction or establishing statutes of limitation. If application of such rules results in an enforcement
action not going forward, the question of how the action is to be conducted does not
even arise. Under this broader view of procedure, a court that finds that it lacks
jurisdiction or that the action is time-barred makes a procedural decision that falls
within the scope of Article III and that is governed by national law.
Both the narrower and broader understandings of procedure are tenable and
Article III does not by its terms favor either one or the other. The rationale for adopting
a broader understanding of procedure is essentially the one mentioned above, viz. that
a rule is arguably procedural as long as it is not substantive. The rationale for adopting
a more restrictive understanding of procedure is twofold. First, for all practical
purposes, a ruling by a court that it lacks jurisdiction defeats enforcement in that court
and therefore operates as a defense to enforcement. In this respect, an arbitral award is
equally denied enforcement whether denial is based on a court's lack of jurisdiction or
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second and related question is precisely what limits, if any, does the Convention
impose on Contracting States in the exercise of their procedural latitude under Article
III.
[Al

What Is a "Rule of Procedure" under Article Illl

In examining the first of these questions-what is a "rule of procedure" for Article III
purposes?-it has become important to draw a distinction between rules of a proce�
dural character that govern the question of "how" enforcement is to be conducted, on
the one hand, and rules of a procedural character that effectively determine "whether"
enforcement is to be had at all, on the other.
According to one view, rules applicable to actions to enforce Convention awards
are to be understood as only those addressing the manner in which such actions are to
proceed. Such rules, by way of example, would readily include those addressing the
scope, length or timing of responsive pleadings or •the availability of document
discovery. Questions of privilege would also fall into this category, as would rules of
evidence more generally. There can be little doubt that such rules, which determine
how an enforcement action shall proceed, qualify as procedural. Such "how" rules
assume that an enforcement action will go forward, and simply determine the
modalities by which it does so. By virtue of Article III, they are not provided for by the
Convention and are instead supplied exclusively by national law.
However, the notion of procedural rules under Article III may be conceived of
more broadly, to include all rules applicable to an enforcement action other than those
that address the merits of the enforcement action, understood as the determination of
whether an award is or is not entitled to be enforced. This view rests largely on a binary
distinction between "substance" and "procedure," the former governing the merits, of
an enforcement action and the latter governing all non-merits issues. So viewed,
procedural rules would not be confined to those governing how an enforcement action
shall proceed, but also whether it shall proceed because the latter, like the former, steer
clear of the enforcement action's merits. Among rules determining whether an
enforcement action shall proceed include those defining judicial jurisdiction or estab
lishing statutes of limitation. If application of such rules results in an enforcement
action not going forward, the question of how the action is to be conducted does not
even arise. Under this broader view of procedure, a court that finds that it lacks
jurisdiction or that the action is time-barred makes a procedural decision that falls
within the scope of Article III and that is governed by national law.
Both the narrower and broader understandings of procedure are tenable and
Article III does not by its terms favor either one or the other. The rationale for adopting
a broader understanding of procedure is essentially the one mentioned above, viz. that
a rule is arguably procedural as long as it is not substantive. The rationale for adopting
a more restrictive understanding of procedure is twofold. First, for all practical
purposes, a ruling by a court that it lacks jurisdiction defeats enforcement in that court
and therefore operates as a defense to enforcement. In this respect, an arbitral award is
equally denied enforcement whether denial is based on a court's lack of juriSdiction or
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on one or more of the defenses to enforcement expressly provided for by Article V of the
Convention. However, by all accounts, the grounds set forth in Article V are the sole
grounds on the basis of which a Convention award may be denied enforcement.2
Arguably, allowing enforcement to be denied on jurisdictional grounds is adding a
defense to enforcement that the Convention does not provide. Thus, Gary Born argues
. that Article III,,must be· read in conjunction with Article V and its exclusive list of
grounds for denying enforcement of a Convention award.' More specifically, Frederic
Bachand explains th3t, in light of the "well-known pro-enforcement bias of the
Convention," Article III can only be understood to address procedural requirements
speaking to the·manner in wbiCh an award is to be enforced, lest it conflicts with Article
v.4

r

Under a second rationale, Contracting States have not only the central obligation
to enforce Convention awards against which no Article V defense can be raised, but
also an obligation to entertain actions to enforce them. Naturally, a court may find that
one or more Article V defenses are established, and on that ground, deny enforcement
of an award, but it must at least entertain the action. When a national court invokes
lack of jurisdiction over an enforcement action, or declares an enforcement action
time-barred, it literally refuses to entertain the action, potentially in violation of this
Convention mandate. It may be maintained that these rules, depending on their terms
or the outcome of their application, undermine the Convention's basic purposes. Such
rules, it may be argued, while viewed as procedural for some purposes, should not be
viewed as procedural for purposes of Article III.
To be sure, some rules do not fit neatly into either the substantive or procedural
category because, while generally viewed as having a procedural, rather than substan
tive, character, they can have a direct bearing on how the merits of an enforcement
action are specifically to be addressed. A good example is burden of proof. Certainly,
burden of proof can, at least under some circumstances, be outcome-determinative.
But, even so, rules on burden of proof do not in themselves provide the substantive
elements of the cause of action to enforce an award or the substantive defenses thereto
and may there_fure fairly, under this first view, be placed, for present purposes, in the
procedural category. Arguably, though, whether viewed as procedural or substantive,
rules on burden of proof are directly governed by the Convention itself and for that
reason alone binding on the courts of Contracting States. More specifically, it is widely
thought that the plaintiff_in_ari'enforcement action bears the burden of establishing that
what it seeks to enforce is 'in fact an arbitral award eligible for enforcement, in view of
the requirement of writing or the requirement, if imposed by a State, that the award
2. See, e.g., Emmanuel Gaillard and Benjamin Siino, Enforcement under the New York Convention,
Global Arbitration Review (last accessed February 21, 2020), available at https://
globalarbitrationreview .com/chapter/1178Ss 6/ enforcement-under-the-new-% E2 % 80 % 89york
convention#footnote-023-backlink.
3. Gary Born, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3413 (2d ed., Kluwer 2014).
4. Frederic Bachand, Overcoming Immunity-Based Objections to the Recognition and Enforcement in
Canada of Investor-State Awards 26 J. INT'L ARB. 85 (2009); Louis del Duca and Nancy Walsh,
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Agreements and Awards: Application of
Convention in the United States 62 AM. J. CoMP. I.Aw 69, 91 (2014).
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have a commercial character. Once the plaintiff carries that burden, the burden is
generally viewed as shifted to the defendant which must then, in order to defeat
enforcement, establish one or more of the Convention's defenses to enforcement.
Thus, even if burden of proof were to be depicted as procedural in character, it is a
matter that the Convention itself, perhaps only impliedly, addresses. On that view,
national courts have no occasion to res ort to Article III to determine burden of proof in
enforcement actions.

[B]

Can a Procedural Issue Become a Problematic Limitation. on the
Application of Article Ill?

Also to be considered is a second serious question. Leaving aside the definitional
question, and assuming that a rule is considered to be procedural for Article III
purposes, are there applications of that rule under national law that so risk impairing
the effectiveness of the Convention that they may not or should not, Article III
notwithstanding, be given effect?
This question has received little attention. But the fact remains that national law
may conceivably prescribe or apply a procedural rule the effect of which is inimical to
the Convention's purposes. If so, that rule, either as a whole or as applied, arguably
may not be given effect. The question then arises as to which rule should be applied in
its place, if the matter is one that indeed calls for a rule. If such a possibility may be
contemplated, then Article III should essentially be understood as creating nothing
more than a presumption-in all likelihood, a powerful one-that national procedural
law applies to procedural aspects of an enforcement action, unless there is a compelling
reason, in light of the Convention's purposes, why it should not. This is an even more
delicate matter than the matter treated above, namely whether a particular rule is or is
not procedural within the meaning of Article III.

§4.02

POTENTIALLY PROBLEMATIC PROCEDURAL ISSUES UNDER
ARTICLE III

In this section, I examine a series of issues that raise either or both of the questions
outlined above. Does the rule address an issue that should be considered as falling
uuder Article III and/or does it, either in itself or as applied, run fundamentally afoul of
the Convention's obj ectives? In other words, how are the matters examined below to be
characterized for Article III purposes and, in the case they are properly treated as
procedural and left to national law under Article III, are there circumstances in which
application of national procedural law should not be countenanced?
[Al

Jurisdiction of Courts

When national courts decline jurisdiction to entertain an action to enforce a Conven
tion award, they effectively deny enforcement, thereby obviating consideration of the
means by which enforcement is to be had. Is their doing so compatible with their treaty
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obligations? Particularly in U.S. legal circles, it is appropriate to distinguish between
lack of subj ect-matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction.

[1]

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Subj ect-matter j urisdiction denotes the capacity of a court to entertain the cause of
action that has been brought before it. I do not understand lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction in this context to entail a Contracting State's denial of access to any of its
courts for purposes of enforcing a Convention award. Rather, I consider it a reflection
of a State's determination that a particular type or category of claim is reserved to
certain courts within its judiciary, specialized or otherwise, to the exclusion of all other
courts. 5
This is not /generally speaking the situation in the United States. The Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"), in 9 U.S.C. § 203, provides that " [a] n action or proceeding
falling under the [New York] Convention shall be deemed to arise under the laws and
treaties of the United States. The district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction m:er· such an ;[cti6n or proceeding, regardless of the amount in contro
versy. "6 While the legislation implementing the Convention creates a new statutory
basis of federal jurisdiction,7 that conferral of jurisdiction on federal courts is not
exclusive of state courts, though actions brought in state court may be removed to
federal court under the rules governing removal.
However, in certain foreign j urisdictions, award enforcement actions may be
brought in certain courts or tribunals only. For example, in Argentina, the Code of Civil
and Commercial Procedure establishes that corresponding first instance courts will
have jurisdiction over the enforcement of foreign awards. 8 ln Japan, the 2003 arbitra
tion law explicitly gr?-Ilts certain district courts subj ect-matter jurisdiction over such
actions. 9 In Peru, the arbitration law grants juris diction to the commercial chambers for
the enforcement of arbitration awards pursuant to the Convention. lo Similar provisions
exist in many other signatory States.
That some Contracting States steer award enforcement actions to certain desig
nated courts only is not in principle problematic. Though an enforcement action may
be dismissed on subject-matter jurisdiction grounds, it presumably may be pursued
elsewhere in that legal system. For that reason, a Contracting State's confinement of
such actions to a certain category of courts cannot be said to unduly hamp er the
enforcement of Convention awards or otherwise frustrate the Convention's purp oses.

5. Richard Garnett, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEEDING IN PruVATE WTERNATIONAL LAw 5.16 (Oxford Private
International Law ,Series 2012). , ' . 1
6. 9 u.s.c. § 203.
7. Transa(lantic Bulk Shipping, Ltd. v. Saudi Chartering S.A. , 622 F. Supp . 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) .
8. Cod. Proc. Civ. Y Com. , Arts. 518-5 19:
9. Arbitration Law, Law No. 138 of 2003 , Art. 46 para. 4 (Japan) .
10. Dec. Legislativo que Norma el Arbitraje, DL. N ° 1071, Art. 8(5) (Peru).
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lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction.
[l]

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
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jurisdiction in this context to entail a Contracting State's denial of access to any of its
courts for purposes of enforcing a Convention award. Rather, I consider it a reflection
of a State's determination that a particular type or category of claim is reserved to
certain courts within its judiciary, specialized or otherwise, to the exclusion of all other
courts. 5
This is not/generally speaking the situation in the United States. The Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"}, in 9 U.S.C. § 203, provides that "[a]n action or proceeding
falling under the [New York] Convention shall be deemed to arise under the laws and
treaties of the United States. The district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction over· such an ,ictJ611
proceeding, regardless of the amount in controversy. "6 While the legislation implementing the Convention creates a new statutory
basis of federal jurisdiction,7 that conferral of jurisdiction on federal courts is not
exclusive of state courts, though actions brought in state court may be removed to
federal court under the rules governing removal.
However, in certain foreign jurisdictions, award enforcement actions may be
brought in certain courts or tribunals only. For example, in Argentina, the Code of Civil
and Commercial Procedure establishes that corresponding fust instance courts will
have jurisdiction over the enforcement of foreign awards. 6 In Japan, the 2003 arbitration law explicitly grants certain district courts subject-matter jurisdiction over such
actions. 9 In Peru, the arbitration law grants jurisdiction to the commercial chambers for
the enforcement of arbitration awards pursuant to the Convention. 10 Similar provisions
exist in many other signatory States.
That some Contracting States steer award enforcement actions to certain designated courts only is not in principle problematic. Though an enforcement action may
be dismissed on subject-matter jurisdiction grounds, it presumably may be pursued
elsewhere in that legal system. For that reason, a Contracting State's confinement of
such actions to a certain category of courts cannot be said to unduly hamper the
enforcement of Convention awards or otherwise frustrate the Convention's purposes.

or

5. Richard Garnett,

SUBSTANCE AND PROCEEDING IN PRIVATE lNTIRNAUONAL

lnternational,Law Series 2012)., ',

'

LAw 5.16 (Oxford

Private

6. 9 u.s.c. § 203.
7. Transatlantic Bulk Shipping, Ltd. v. Saudi Chartering S.A., 622 F. Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
8. Cod. Proc. Civ. Y Com., Arts. 518"519.
9. Arbitration Law, Law No. 138 of 2003, Art. 46 para. 4 (Japan).
10. Dec. Legislativo que Norma el Arbitraje, DL. N° 1071, Art. 8(5) (Peru).
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Dismissal of an enforcement action on personal jurisdiction grounds is more problematic. Personal jurisdiction denotes the power of a court to adjudicate a claim over which
it has subject-matter jurisdiction brought against a particular defendant. Many countries apparently have no particular rules governing the exercise of personal jurisdiction
in award enforcement actions. These include Argentina,11 Canada, 12 Malaysia,13
Greece 14 and India. 15
However, many countries, like Hong Kong16 and Israel,1 7 do impose personal
jurisdiction requirements. In the v.s., award enforcement actions, whether in state or
federal court, are presumably subject to the same rules applicable to personal jurisdiction in civil actions generally.
In the case of Transatlantic v. Saudi. Chartering S.A., 1 8 the court specifically
observed that the statute implementing the New York Convention does not give U.S.
courts power over all persons throughout the world who have entered into an
arbitration agreement covered by the Convention. Not only must the applicable state
long-arm statute be met, but due process under the U.S. Constitution requires a basis
(typically characterized as "minimum contacts") sufficient to establish what is known
as specific jurisdiction (i.e., personal jurisdiction over a party with respect to a
particular claim) .19 The Court ruled that a sufficient nexus between the defendant and
11. Noodt Taquela Maria Blanca, Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention in.
Allrentina, in Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 91, in .Tue INTERPRIITATION AND
APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CoNVl!NTION BY NIJIONAL CoURTS (George Bennann, ed.) (New York,
Springer Int1;Tnational Publishing 2017) (notwithstanding the lack of an explicit provision, an
Argentine court is likely to exercise its competence in cases involving estates or goods located in
Argentina, and where the domicile of the award's debtor is in Argentina).
12. Frederic Bachand and Fabien Gelinas, Interpretation and Application of the New _York Convention in Canada, in Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 163, 180, in THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF nra NEW YORK CoNvmmoN BY NATIONAL COURTS {George Bermann, ed.)
(New York, Springer International Publishing 2017).
13. Choong Yeow Choy and Datuk Sundra Rajoo, Interpretation and Application of the New York
Convention in Malaysia., in Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awa;ds, 651, 673, in THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OP THE NEW YoRI< CONVENTION BY NATIONAL COURTS {George
Bermann, ed.) (New York, Springer International Publishing 2017).
14. Rajesh Sharma and Suraj Sajnani, Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention in
Hong Kong, in Recognition and Enfor,:ement of Arbitral Awa;ds, 417, 429, in THE IN'raRPRET.ATJON
AND APPLICATiON OF me NEW Yoru< CONVENTION BY NATIONAL COURTS (George Bermann, ed.) (New
York, Springer International Publishing 2017).
15. Ashutosh Kumar, Raina Upadhyay, Anusha Jegadeesh and Yakshay Chheda, Interpretation and
App!ication of the New York Convention in India, in Recognition and Enforcement of Aroitral
Awards, 445, 470, in THE lNTI!RPRETATION .AND APPLICATION OF me NEW Yoru< CONVENTION BY
NATIONAL COURTS (George Bermann, ed.) (New York, Springer International Publishing 2017).
16. Sharma and Sajnani, supra n. 14, at 432.
17. Talia Einborn, Interpretation and Application. of the New York Convention in Israel, in Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 523, 553, in THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLIC.ATION 01' TIIE
NEW YoRI< CONVENTION BY NATIONAL COURTS (George Bermann, ed.) (New York, Springer
International Publishing 2017}.
18. 622 F. Supp. 25 (S.b.N.Y. 1985).
19. It is also of interest what the role of general jurisdiction could be, as it is much less likely to be
found in an enforcement action. For example, in SoneraHolding B. V. v. QllcurovaHolding A.$.,
the Second Circuit dismissed an action for recognition of an award because the debtor did not
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the forum must first be established, whether on the basis of residence, conduct, the
location of property, or some other connecting factor. 20 Moreover, even if such a nexus
is established, personal jurisdiction may nevertheless be denied if the court's exercise
of jurisdiction is viewed, under the totality of the circumstances, as unreasonable. 21
Thus, in the case of Glen.core Grain Rotterdam B. V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., the
Ninth Circuit confirmed a federal district court judgment that an award debtor with no
presence or property in the jurisdiction fails to meet the personal jurisdiction threshold. 22 Many other U.S. courts have confirmed that personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, under the usual standards, is essential in order for an action to enforce a
Convention award to proceed.23
The Second Circuit confronted the same question directly in the case of Frontera
Resources Azerbaijan Corporation v. State Oil Company of the Azerbauan Republic.1.11,
There, the district coi.Jrt dismissed the plaintiff's petition on the basis oflack of personal
jurisdiction, due to the absence of sufficient contacts. On appeal, the award creditor
argued that a federal court's personal jurisdiction to entertain an enforcement action
against the defendant was not-subject to the usual personal jurisdiction requirements,
due to the New York Con:{ention's having laid down the exclusive grounds for refusing
enforcement and lack of personal jurisdiction not figuring among them. 25 According to
the appellate court, personal jurisdiction is fundamental to the court's power to
exercise judicial authority over a defendant. In the Court's understanding, Article V
refers to the substantive grounds on which a court may deny enforcement of a
Convention award on the merits, but says nothing about a court's.Jurisdiction to make
any such determination. 26
Obviously, these rulings reflect the view that personal jurisdiction is a procedural
matter subject to Article Ill, even though it determines not "how" an action shall
proceed, but "whether" it shall proceed. This potentially places severe limitations on
the enforceability of Convention awards in the U.S., since it will be the relatively rare
case in which the award debtor in a Convention case has sufficient contacts with a

20.
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

have sufficient jurisdictional connections with New York to meet the newly-minted general
jurisdiction standard addressed to plenary actions. See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman and Aaron D.
Simowitz, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements and Awards: What Hath Daim.el
Wrought?, 91 N.Y.U. L REv. 344 (2016).
Supra n. 7.
See, e.g., Tekordia Tech, Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd, 458 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2006) (based on the U.S. Constitution, the court established that in personam jurisdiction could be exercised so long as
the defendant had certain minimum contacts with the forum, such that the maintenance of the
suit does noH,ffend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice); Base Metal Trading
v. OjscNovokuznetsky Aluminum Factory, 283 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2002) (the court ruled that Due
Process required minimum contacts with the forum to be established. The court found that no
sufficient minimum contacts were established in the case). See generally Elsa A. Paparemborde,
Preuenti.ve Requests for the Enforcement ofForeign ArbitralAwards; Toward an Effective Filtering
Mechanism under the Neu1 Yo'rk,Convention, 25 AM. R.Ev. !NT'L Alu!. 187 (2014).
Glencore·Graili. Rotterdain,B: V. Shivnath Ra.i Hamarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002).
See Telcordia Tech, Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd, 458 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2006); Base Metal Tradingv. Ojsc
Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory, 283 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2002).
Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id.
Id.

v.
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particular state in the U.S. to meet standard personal jurisdiction requirements. The
mobility of Convention awards, and thereby the effectiveness of the Convention,
would be dramatically reduced. The only plausible justification is that, in U.S. law, the
sufficiency of contacts to justify an assertion of personal jurisdiction by either a state or
federal court is considered to be a matter, at least in part, of constitutional due
process. 27 Neither the New York Convention nor the federal statute implementing it
can override the mandates of due process.
However, U.S. courts have found a way to lessen these difficulties. They have
allowed an award creditor to assert jurisdiction lacking the necessary contacts With the
forum by allowing plaintiffs to invoke quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Under quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction, a court may assert jurisdiction strictly on the basis of the presence of
defendant's assets in the forum, even though those assets bear no relationship to the
underlying dispute. In a ruling outside the international arbitration field, 28 the Supreme
Court suggested that quasi-in-rem jurisdiction suffices to ground enforcement of a
foreign judgment if the purpose of the action is not to impose a fresh liability on the
defendant over a party, but merely to enforce a liability imposed by a foreign court that
itself had proper jurisdiction. Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is now regularly, and successfully, invoked by U.S. courts to establish jurisdiction over the defendant in an award
enforcement action, even when the contacts ordinarily necessary to establish specific
jurisdiction are not present, and the Restatement of the U.S. Law of International
Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration supports this approach. 29 However, the
value of a judgment predicated on quasi-in-rem jurisdiction cannot exceed the value of
the local property.
In sum, denial of personal jurisdiction to hear an enforcement action is not, in the
U.S., quite as problematic as may appear. As a practical matter, the exercise of
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction may enable a court to surmount the jurisdictional problem in
the first place.
[BJ

Standing

Standing is a widely accepted requirement for the maintenance of litigation, demand·
ing that a plaintiff have an actual interest or "sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy. "30 This has the potential
to restrict and even prevent the enforcement of a Convention award under Article UI.
The requirement of standing represents no problem for a plaintiff who was a party to

27. See, e.g., Louis de! Duca and Nancy Welsh, Interpretation and Application of the New York
Convention in the United States, in THE INIERPRE!ATION AND APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORI(
CONVENTION BY NATIONAL COURTS (George Berroann, ed.) (New York, Springer International
Publishing 2017).
28. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
29. Restatement Third, The U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, Proposed Final Draft
§ 4. 2.5 (hereinafter "Restatement").
30. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). See generally, Paparemborde, supra n. 21
looking at France and alluding to "quasiment tousles systems juricliques" or "the vast majority
of legal systems."
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the arbitration giving rise to the award sought to be enforced. 31 The Restatement
provides that a party to an arbitration automatically has standing to seek judicial
enforcement of the resulting award. It calls such parties "proper plaintiffs" and "proper
defendants''. in·;(;! post-award action.Si If a natural or legal person participates as a party
without another party objecting, those other parties waive any rights of objection to its
status as a proper plaintiff. The other parties can preserve their right to oppose
post-award action simply by objecting. But the arbitral tribunal might overrule the
objection, I:fl:ld~i;i.ngtheffe,fE\b~-a proper plaintiff. In case one of multiple parties objects
to a party's status as proper plaintiff, only the objecting party preserves its right to
oppose post-award relief. 33
Similar concepts are widely acknowledged across jurisdictions. Such, for example, is the case in Italy34 and Colombia.35 As long as Contracting States entitle the
successful party to an arbitration to seek enforcement against the unsuccessful party to
the arbitration-as all States do-standing rules under national law do not stand to
frustrate the Convention's objectives.
However, courts in many jurisdictions allow enforcement actions to be brought
by or against non-signatories to an arbitration agreement, or even by or against
non-parties to an arbitration. 36 In such jurisdictions, a non-signatory seeking to enforce
an award against a signatory or a signatory seeking to enforce an award against a
non-signatory bears the burden of proving that the non-signatory is a proper plaintiff or
defendant, as the case may be. In the U.S. case of Leatt Corporation v. Innovative Safety
Technology, LLC, 37 the court specifically explained that under Article lII of the New
York Convention, non-signatories may be bound by an arbitration agreement under
"ordinary contract and agency principles, such as agency or alter ego."38 Similarly, in
CBF Industria De Gusa S/A v. AMCT Hol.dings, Inc., the court ruled that whether an
31. Cf. FAA Chapters 2 and 3 stating that "any party to the arbitration may apply [... ] for an order
confirming ·1:1:re· award.~ 9 U.S.C. §§ 207, 302; and Chapter 'l stating that "any party to the
arbitration may apply to the court [...] for an order confirming the award,· id., § 9, and that
under proper circumstances a court may vacate an award "upon the application of any party to
the arbitration," id., § lO(a).
32. Restatement § 4.28 (a) and §..4.29 (a).
·33_ Restater,ie~i § 4.28, Repciffur's:Notes, comment b.
34. In Italy, all parties to an arbitration, as well as their legal successors in interest, have standing to
sue. Aldo Frignani, Interpretation a.n.d Application of the New York Convention in Italy, 561, 582,
in Tm; lNTERPRETATION AND APPIJCATION Ol' THE NEW YORK CONVENTION BY NATIONAL COURTS (George
Bermann, ed.) (New York, Springer International Publishing 2017).
35. In Colombia, the Supreme Court held in Drummond Ferrovla..s that the parties to arbitration are
entitled to enforce the resulting award, but that so too do their successors in interest. Eduardo
Zuleta and Rafael Rinc6n, Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention in
Col.ombia., 219, 235-236, in THE INTERPRETATION AND APPU~TION OF '!HE NEW YoRJt CoNVENTJON BY
NATIONAL CoURTS (George Bermann, ed.) (New York, Springer International Publishing 2017).
36. Regarding the standard of review applied by the enforcement court on the question of a
non-signatory being bound by the arbitration agreement, see Dallah 11. Pakistan [2010] USKC 46
(November 3, 2010), paras. 104-105.
37. Leatt Corp. 11. InnOll!ltive 5afety Tech., U.C, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71362, at 1S (S.D. Cal. July 15,
2010).
38. Id., at 15, citing comer 11. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1101 {9th Cir. 2009); Jn re Arbitrotion
Between Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. 11. Na.k Fa.~ogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 494-95
(2d Cir. 2002); Letizia. v. Prudentia.lBa.che Sec., Inc., 802 F.2d 1185, 1187-1188 (9th Cir. 1986).
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award may be enforced against a third party not named in the arbitration agreement or
award is "left to the law of the enforcing jurisdiction, here the Southern District of New
York, under the terms of Article Ill of the New York Convention. "39
The Restatement has introduced the concept of "proper plaintiff" to this problem
area as well. 40 It states in § 4.28 (b) that "a court may, in exceptional circumstances,
determine that a person not a party to an arbitral proceeding is a proper plaintiff in a
post-award action if it satisfies one of the grounds on which a nonparty is permitted to
enforce the arbitration agreement, " namely consent to the arbitration agreement,
agency, 41 implied consent,42 estoppel,43 waiver,44 veil piercing,45 corporate relation
ships, succession,46 subrogation,47 assignment,48 other transfer, and Third-party ben
eficiaries.49 The Restatement stresses that the underlying purpose of all these doctrines
and theories found in U.S. law is to discern the parties' intent50-whether the intent is
formed by the parties or imputed to them in light of the purpose of the arbitration
agreement-and to ensure the rational and fair application of the arbitration clause. 51
According to § 2 . 3 (c) of the Restatement a court determines whether a non
signatory is bound by or may invoke an international arbitration agreement pursuant
to the law applicable to that issue under the choice-of-law rules of the forum. It is in the
discretion of the court to take into account whether determining the non-party's
standing can be resolved without unduly complicating the post-award proceeding and
whether the non-party could and should have participated52 in the arbitral proceeding
as a party. 53
Contracting States may and will differ in the extent to which they allow
non-signatories or non-parties to bring an enforcement action or be named as defen
dant in such an action, thus compromising the Convention's uniform application.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
. 49.
SO.
51.
52.
53.

v. AMQ HoldiRgs, Inc., 850 F.3d 58, 75 (2d Cir. 2017) ; see also Brief
of Arnicus Curiae Association of the Bar of the City of New York at 2-3, 6; cf. Orion Shipping &
Trading Co., 312 F.2d at 301.
Restatement, § 2.3 comments a-f.
Cf. Bridas S.A. P.1.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 356 [5th Cir. 2003); Inter.gen N. V.
v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 147-148 (1st Cir. 2003) ; Memll Lynch inv. v. Optibase, Ltd., 337 F.3d 125,
130 (2d Cir. 2003) ; Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. AAA, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995) .
Cf. Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d l lOO, nos (2d Cir. 1991) .
Cf. Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir. 19_99); Int'l
Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 417-418 {4� Crr. 2000) .
Cf. Deloitte Noraudit A/5 v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, U.S., 9 F.3d 1060, 1064 {2d Cir. 1993).
Cf. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Keniieth R. Ambrose. [11£., 727 F.2d 279, 284 {3d Cir.
1983); Interocean Shi.pping Co. v. National Shipping and Trading C.Crrp., 523 F.2d 527, 539 (2d
Circuit 1975) .
Cf. Marchetta v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 71 1 F. Supp. 936, 939 (N.D. Dl. 1989) .
Cf. Allianz Global Risk U.S. Ins. Co. v. GE, 470 F. App'x 652, 654 (9th Cir. 2012); Am. Bureau of
Shipp ing V. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir. 1999).
.
Cf. Trefny v. Bear Steams Sec. Corp., 243 B.R. 300, 316 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1999); Nrssan Motor
Acceptance Corp. v. Ross, 703 So. 2d 324, 326 (Ala. 1997).
Cf. Intergen N. V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 146 (1st Cir. 2003); Collins v. International Dairy Queen,
2 F. Supp. 2d 1465, 1469 {M.D. Ga. 1998) .
Shererv. Green Tree SeroicingUC, 548 F.3d 379, 3 8 1 (5th Cir. 2008); McCarth.y v. Azure, 2 2 F.3d
351, 355.
Born, supra n. 3, at 1452.
Cf. Techcapital Corp. v. Arrwco Corp., 2001 WL 267010, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. March 19, 2001) .
Restatement, § 4.28 (b) .
CBFindustria De Gusa. 5/A
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However, it is difficult to argue that such an application of national law through Article
III is so inimical to the Convention's purposes as to be disallowed. If anything, it
represents an expansion of the enforcement that the Convention mandates. Under this
view, national courts may invoke their own law to determine the extent, if any, to
which non-signatories or non-parties have a sufficient stake in the arbitration to
warrant their entitlement to seek enforcement of an award or are sufficiently implicated
to justify being subjected to an enforcement action.
[CJ

Forum Non Conveniens

Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine that allows a court to decline to

exercise jurisdiction that it unquestionably enjoys under circumstances in which the
defendant is able to identify an alternative jurisdiction, to which it is willing to subject
itself, that is a Hl;anifesily more convenient forum and whose law (or whatever law it
will apply under its choice-of-law rules) is capable of affording the plaintiff an adequate
remedy. 54 Although application of forum non conveniens results in non-enforcement of
an award by the court where enforcement is sought, it, like lack of jurisdiction, may be
treated as a,pro�e_dural lllet;hanj:sm r:ather than a determination on the merits. 55
On thkbasis, most ' U.S. courts have either explicitly found the foro.m non
conveniens doctrine to be available in Convention enforcement actions or accepted it to
be available without deciding the issue. The first notable decision is In re Arbitration
between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Na�ogaz of Ukrainel6 There, the
Second Circuit affirmed a district court's dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds of
an action seeking to enforce an award not only against a Ukrainian State instrumen
tality, but also Ukraine itself, a non-signatory. It found that determining whether
. Ukraine could be bound by the award would inquire a fact-intensive inquiry into the
relationship between the two entities for which most of the relevant evidence was in
Ukraine, and largely on that basis decided that the U.S. district court was not an
appropriate forum, 57 and that the action should be dismissed. Nearly ten years later, in
Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic ofPeru,58 the Second Circuit
reversed a district court's denial of forum non conveniens. It found that a Peruvian law
capping the amount that agencies could in any given year pay to satisfy judgments at
a percentage of their budgets represented a powerful public interest factor which,
under traditional forum non conveniens analysis, weighs heavily in favor of dis
missal. 59 Since then, several other U.S. courts have entertained petitions for dismissal

54. Restatement Third, The U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, Proposed Final Draft
§ 4.27, co=ent a (2019) .
55. ATIL Dredging Co . v. Miller, 5 1 0 U.S. 443, 453 (1994).
56. ht re Aroitra/itm between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nol<. No.ftogaz of Ukraine, 311
-F.3d 488 -'l2d Clr. 2002) /
..,. · ,., ; .'
57. Id., at 499-501.
· 58. Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltd.a. v. Republic ofPeru, 665 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2011) .
59. Id., at 392-294.
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However, it is difficult to argue that such an application of national law through Article
III is so inimical to the Convention's purposes as to be disallowed. If anything, it
represents an expansion of the enforcement that the Convention mandates. Under this
view, national courts may invoke their own law to determine the extent, if any, to
which non-signatories or non-parties have a sufficient stake in the arbitration to
warrant their entitlement to seek enforcement of an award or are sufficiently implicated
to justify being subjected to an enforcement action.
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Forum Non Conveniens

Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine that allows a court to decline to
exercise jurisdiction that it unquestionably enjoys under circumstances in which the
defendant is able to identify an alternative jurisdiction, to which it is willing to subject
itself, that is a ffi;anifesily more convenient forum and whose law (or whatever law it
will apply under its choice-of-law rules) is capable of affording the plaintiff an adequate
remedy. 54 Although application of forum non conveniens results in non-enforcement of
an award by the court where enforcement is sought, it, like lack of jurisdiction, may be
treated as a,proc;edural me<;ha~sm rather than a determination on the merits. 55
On this basis, most U.S. courts have either explicitly found the forum non
conveniens doctrine to be available in Convention enforcement actions or accepted it to
be available without deciding the issue. The first notable decision is In re Arbitration
between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Na{togaz of Ukraine. 56 There, the
Second Circuit affirmed a district court's dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds of
an action seeking to enforce an award not only against a Ukrainian State instrumentality, but also Ukraine itself, a non-signatory. It found that determining whether
Ukraine could be bound by the award would inquire a fact-intensive inquiry into the
relationship between the two entities for which most of the relevant evidence was in
Ukraine, and largely on that basis decided that the U.S. district court was not an
appropriate forum, 57 and that the action should be dismissed. Nearly ten years later, in
Figueiredo Ferraz E En.genharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 58 the Second Circuit
reversed a district court's denial of forum non conveniens. It found that a Peruvian law
capping the amount that agencies could in any given year pay to satisfy judgments at
a percentage of their budgets represented a powerful public interest factor which,
under traditional forum non conveniens analysis, weighs heavily in favor of dismissal. 59 Since then, several other U.S. courts have entertained petitions for dismissal

54. Restatement Third, The U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, Proposed Final Draft
§ 4.27, co=ent a (2019).
55. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994).
56. In re Arbitration between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311
F.3d488{2dCrr.2002)/'/;' ·'
,·
.
57. Id., at 499-501.
.
· 58. Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia deProjeto Ltd.a. v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2011).
59. Id., at 392-294.
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of enforcement actions on forum non conveniens grounds, some granting that relief, 60
and others not. 61 An unusual example of the latter is TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop.
Fund of Ukraine, 62 in which the federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
refused to dismiss an enforcement action on forum non conveniens grounds because
only a U.S. court can attach the assets of a foreign sovereign's property within the U.S.
and, thus, there was no adequate alternative forum for that purpose. In fact, the foreign
State apparently had no property at the time in the U.S. to attach, but the court
consldered that enforcement of the award in the U.S. would enable the award creditor
to attach assets if and when they could be found in the U.S. 63 A handful of U.S. courts
have reserved judgment on, 64 or expressed skepticism about, 65 whether forum non
conueniens can apply to Convention enforcement actions, but until recently66 no U.S.
court has explicitly found that it does not.
Although forum non conveniens dismissal is practiced in most common law
jurisdictions, the only jurisdiction in which a court outside the U.S. is known to have
dismissed an award enforcement action on that ground is Israel. 67 Courts in Canada
have suggested that forum non conveniens dismissal might be available in an action to
enforce a Convention award, but have not actually decided the issue. 68 However, the
notion of dismissing an action on convenience grounds is widely rejected around the

60. See, e.g., CHS Eur. S.A. v. El Attal, No. 09-CV-2619(LAK), 2010 WL 3000059, at •3 (S.D.N.Y. July
2Z, 2010) (dismissing on FNC grounds); Termorio S.A. E.S.P. v. ElectrificadoraDelAtlantico S.A.
E.S.P., 421 F.Supp.2d 87, 88 (D.D.C. 2006) (alternatively dismissing enforcement action onFNC
grounds).
61. See, e.g., Constellation Energy Commodities Group Inc. v. TransfieldER Cape Ltd., 801 F.Supp.2d
211, 2.19 (S.D.N.Y. 2011} (distinguishing Monegasque on the ground that plaintiff was domestic,
not foreign, and thus its choice of forum warranted deference); Crescendo Maritime Co. v. Bank
of Communications Co. Ltd., No. 15-CV-4481(JFK) 2016 WL 750351, at •10 (S.D.N.Y. February
22, 2016) (confuming award after finding forum convenient); Higgins v. SPX Corp., No.
l:05-CV-846, 2006 WL 1008677, at •4 (W.D. Mich. April 18, 2006) (applying Monegasque but
finding forum non conveniens not grounds not met); Satyam Computer Seroices Ltd v. Venture
Global Engineering LLC, No. 06-CV-50351-DT, 2.006 WL 6495377, at •7 (July 13, 2006) (same);
Continental Transfert_ Technique Ltd. v. Federal Gov. of Nigeria, 697 F.Supp.2d 46, 57-S8 (D.D.C.
2010) (same); Soner!l Holding B. V. v. Cv:kurova Holding A.S., 895 F. Supp. 2d 513, 523-526
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (same) (rev'd on other grounds).
62. TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 303-304 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
63. See also, in theD.C. Circuit:BalkanEnergyLimitedv. Republic of Ghana, 302 F.Supp.3d 144, 155
(D .D. C. 2018) (applying TMR to reject a motion for forum non conveniens dismissal); LLC
Kam.stray v. Republic of Moldov!l, No. 14-CV-01921(CRC) 2019 WL 3997385, •6 (D.D.C. August
23, 2019) (same); Tatne~ v. Ukraine, 301 F.Supp.3d 175, 193-194 (D.D.C. 2018).
64. Melton v. Oy Nautor Ab, No. 97-15395, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22100, "2-3 (9th Cir. September 4,
1998) Oeaving the question open in dictum, as the party waived the argument below).
65. Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications AB v. Delta Electronics (Thailand], No. C-09-1326 MMC,
2009 WL 1874063, •2 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2009).
66. Estate of Ke Zhengguangt v. Yu Naifen Stephyany, 2020 WL 886146 at 5-6 (D. Md., February 24,
2020}.
67. Einbom, supra n. 17, at 556 (referencing Zvi Vidavski v. Chaya. Simon, Application Pursuant to
Appeal 2017/94 (June 16, 1994) and Menachem Greenbaum v. Yehoshua Greenbaum, Family
Case (Jerusalem) 540/01 (October 17, 2001)).
68. Sistem Miihendislik IIL)aat Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Kyrgyz Republic, 2012 ONSC 4351
146 (July 25, 2012); Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje, 2015 sec 42,177 (September 4, 2015).
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world. 69 ln such jurisdictions, it,s practice is viewed, as a general matter, as anomalous.
But it is s~ /as' -espectany:'troubling because it operates as an obstacle to the
entertainment of enforcement actions, which is widely viewed as an obligation under
the. Convention, and because it jeopardizes the Convention's goals of uniformity in the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 70
A second objection to application of forum non conveniens in this context mirrors
the objection to treating lack of personal jurisdiction as a basis for dismissing an
enforcement action. Treating lack of personal jurisdiction as such amounts, it is
argued, to adding a defense to enforcement to the exclusive list of defenses set out in
the Convention. The question is whether assertion of forum non conveniens as a basis
for dismissal can be meaningfully distinguished from assertion of a Convention defense
to enforcement There are differences. First, the availability or unavailability of a
Convention defense is a defense on the merits in an enforcement action, whereas forum
non conveniens determines whether the merits of an enforcement action may even be
reached. Second, the Convention defenses represent challenges either to the arbitration
agreement, the arbitral proceedings or the arbitral award. Forum non conveniens raises
none of those questions; it challenges the suitability of the court where enforcement is
sought to entertain the enforcement action and entertain the Convention defenses, if
raised.
Still, the Restatement takes the position that forum non conveniens is not
available as a defense in an enforcement action, 71 both because its availability would,
as a practical matier; run afoul of the exclusivity of the Convention greunds for denying
enforcement72 and because Contracting States have an international treaty obligation
under the Convention to entertain enforcement actions, even if they ultimately deny ·
enforcement on the merits. In p.ddition, application of the doctrine "could result in
unfair surprise to foreign paI'ties that would otherwise reasonably anticipate being able
to enforce Convention·awards in the United States."73 Commentators mostly agree. 74
One commentator has argued that forum non corweniens "drive[s] a coach and horses

69.

See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand and Scott R. Jablonski,

FORUM

NON CoNVENIENS: HlsTORY, GLOBAL

PRAcno;:, AND Fll'IURE UNDER THE HAGUE CoNVENTJON ON CHOICE OF CoullT AGR££MENT'S 2 (Oxford

70.
71.
72.

73.
74.

University Press 2007) (describing the lack of convenience-based dismissal doctrines in civil law
countries) .
Restatement § 4.27, Reporters· Note (b) (ii).
Restatement§ 4.27.
Id .• § 4.27, commentb.
Id. .
See, e.g., Mohita K. Anand, The Misapplication and.Misinterpretation ofForum Non Convenien.s,
4 YEARllOOI( ON ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 357, 363, 367 (2012); Pelagia Ivanova, Forom Non
Conveniens and Persoruil Jurisdiction: Procedural Limitations on the Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards Under the New York Convention, 83 B.U. L. R.Ev. 899, 920 (2003); Professors
Louis Del Duca and Nancy Walsh have made the important point that, since U.S. courts
explicitly give less deference to foreign plaintiffs under a forum non convenien.s analysis, their
application of the doctrine runs afoul of Article III's prohibition against imposing-substantially
more onerous conditions· on enforcement of Convention awards than domestic ones. Del Duca
and Walsh, supra n. 4, at 91.
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through" the Convention. 75 Forum non conveniens may also be distinguished importantly from lack of jurisdiction. While limitations on jurisdiction are imposed by
national law-in the· U.S. by national constitutional law-forum non conveniens
dismissal is not. It is a purely discretionary doctrine, as evidenced by the application by
courts of appeal of an "abuse of discretion" standard in reviewing a district court's
willingness or unwillingness to dismiss an enforcement action on forum non conveniens grounds. It is also legitimate to ask whether, fiad they considered the matter, the
drafters would have viewed application of forum non conveniens as compatible with .
the Convention. That seems unlikely.
Others have taken a more nuanced position. The International Commercial
Disputes Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York has taken the
position that forum non conveniens should not be a ground for denial of enforcement
unless a non-party to the agreement is named in the enforcement action, in which case
dismissal for forum non conveniens may be justifiable. 76 This view too has support in
commentary. 77
What has been said above would be equally applicable to an assertion of other
abstention doctrines, such as the political question doctrine or act of state doctrine,
although successful assertion of either is, for various reasons, improbable. Act of state
presents a particular situation. In the U.S., the FAA itself specifically bars invocation of
the act of state doctrine in cases arising under the Convention. 76 The question of its
compatibility with the Convention does not therefore arise.

[DJ

Lis Pendens

In many jurisdictions, there prevails a rule that an action must be stayed or dismissed

if the same claim has previously been brought and is pending in the courts of another
jurisdiction. Details of the lis pendens doctrine vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Its
application may be mandatory or discretionary, and it may apply differently-or not at
all-if the claims are the not the same, but only very closely related. Those differences
75. Hayk Kupelyants, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the Absence of the
Debtor and His Assets Within the Jurisdiction: Reversing the Burden of Proofl4(3) J. PruvArtlNT'L
L. 471 (2018). The author goes on to say, though, that "since the New York Convention does not
regulate the issue of international competence of national courts, forum conveniens may
potentially be deployed without encroaching on the pro-arbitration stance of the New York
Convention."
76. See Alan Scott Rau, Errors of Comity: FornmNon Conveniens Returns to the Second Circait 23 AM.
REv. INT'L ARB. 1, 13, 15 (2012). The International C□ =ercial Disputes Committee of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Lack of Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens
as Defenses to the Enforcement of Foreign. Arbitral Awards 15 AM. REv. lNT'L ARB. 407, 411,
430431, 435 (2008) questions whether FNC is properly considered procedural in the Article Ill
context and suggests that parties waive FNC defenses in their arbitration agreements to avoid
this issue; also analogized to Warsaw Convention and argued that the same analysis as in
Hosaka should apply, eventually arguing that application of forum non conveniens as a bar to
enforcement is ••fundamentally inconsistent with the Convention's essential purpose"' and
contrary to its exclusive grounds for non•enforcement
77. See, e.g., Linda Silberman, The New York Convention a~er Fifty Years: Some Reflections on the
Role of National Law 38 GA. J. lNT'L & COMP. L. 25, 39-40 (2009).
78. 9 u.s.c. § 15.
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aside, the question arises whether a lis pendens rule of any description prevailing in the
place where enforcement of a Convention award is sought may, consistent with the
Convention's purposes, be invoked and applied to stay or dismiss an enforcement
action in a court of a Contracting State. Put differently, is it contrary to the Convention's
purposes to bar an award creditor from maintaining an enforcement action in more
than one jurisdiction1
That question should be answered in the affirmative. The Convention requires
courts of Contracting States to entertain actions to enforce a Convention award. It does
not by its terms excuse a court of a Contracting State from fulfilling that obligation on
the ground that an action to enforce the same award is pending elsewhere. There are
also practical considerations. It is entirely plausible that the assets of the award debtor
in the jurisdictioa.,where-enforcement is first sought are insufficient to satisfy the award
in its entirety, and the award creditor should not be required to content itself with
collection of an award only in part. To the extent that double recovery is a source of
concern, it can easily be avoided by application of the rules that are generally available
to bar that ev,nm;al,ity. In Pt~;e.i{c,eption.allyrare circumstance in which an enforcement
action is found to have been brought for harassment purposes only, courts likewise
have the means, such as abuse of rights or abuse of process, to address the situation.
All in all, whether viewed as strictly procedural in nature or not, the doctrine of
lis pendens has no place under the Article III umbrella.

[E]

Claim and lssue Preclusion

Whether, and if so to what extent, courts exercise claim or issue preclusion is widely
viewed as a procedural matter and seemingly subject to Article Ill. Because the stakes
of claim and issue preclusion differ significantly, they need to be treated separately.
[1]

Claim Preclusion.

· Claim preclusion, or res judicata, may arise in two different enforcement settings. The
first is whether a claim may be denied enforcement under the Convention on the
ground that the tribunal whose award is sought to be enforced entertained a claim that
had already been adjudicated, either in a prior litigation or, more likely, a prior
arbitration. 79 Violation of res judicata is not in and of itself a Convention defense to
enforcement and.may npt be invoked on a stand-alone basis. However, the possibility
cannot be excluded that a court would regard res judicata as so fundamental value that
enforcement of the award would be viewed as an offense to public policy, under Article
V(2)(b). Arguably, this has occurred in both the Czech Republic80 and Mexico. 81 The

79. See, e.g., Restatement§ 4.35, ~Claim Preclusive Effect of an Arbitral Award."
80. Alexander J. Belohlavek, Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention in Czech
Republic, 277, in THE INTERl'RETATlON AND APPUCATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION BY NATIONAL
CollllTS (George Bermann, ed.) (New York, Springer International Publishing 2017).
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Convention would appear to raise no obstacle to a court's doing so.82 An enforcing
court is presumably entitled to determine for itself what constitutes public policy and
whether enforcement of a given award would violate it.
Strictly speaking, this is not an-Article III scenario. Res judicata is not being raised
as a basis for refusing to hear an enforcement action. It is a matter of definition of public
policy, hence a merits issue.
The second scenario in which res judicata may arise is also not, strictly speaking,
an enforcement matter, but rather a recognition matter, likewise governed by the
Convention. An arbitral award, unless invalid, is entitled under the Convention not
only to enforcement but also recognition. If an award is recognized, by definition the
underlying claim cannot again be adjudicated, so that an arbitration agreement cannot
be invoked for _purposes of adjudicating the same claim. Invoking national law on claim
preclusion cannot seriously be regarded as an Article III problem. It is, in fact, a
Convention obligation.
However, the problem does not entirely disappear because jurisdictions do not all
have the same rules on the application of res judicata. They may, and are indeed likely,
to impose further requirements beyond recognition, such as identity of parties and
identity of claims.83 They may also broaden the scope of application of res juclicata by
foreclosing not only assertion of the same claim, but also a claim based on the same
facts that could have been raised in the first action but was not. 84 Article ill
presumptively allows courts to apply their own understandings of the contours of claim
preclusion.85 It is theoretically possible, but highly unlikely, that national law on claim
preclusion would be so restrictive as to imperil, as a practical matter, the recognition of
Convention awards.
[2]

Issue Preclusion

Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, entails treating as conclusive-and thus
incapable of being revisited-a finding of fact or law in a prior adjudication, even if that
was an adjudication of a different claim. 86 It presupposes an identity of issue and may,
though not invariably, presume an identity of parties. 87
·
Issue preclusion may arise when an action to enforce an award is challenged on
the ground that the same award was previously denied enforcement by the court of
another jurisdiction on the basis of a finding that one or more of the Convention's
defenses was established. The party resisting enforcement in the second action,
81. Claus von Wobeser, Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention in Mexi.co, 687,
in THE lmERPRETAnON AND .APPIJCATION OF TllE NEW YORK CONVENTION BY NATIONAL CoURTS (George
Bermann, ed.) (New York, Springer International Publishing 2017).
82.. The Restatement holds out the posstllllity that a court might deny enforcement based on Article
V's public policy exception. Restatement§ 4.35, comment j.
83. Filip De Ly and Aubrey Sheppard, ILA Interim Report on Res Jud.icata and Arbitration 25 ARB.
J'NT'L 35, 36 (2009).
84. Id., at 36.
BS. Restatement § 4.35, comment d.
86. De Ly and Sheppard, .supra n. 83, at 42.
87. lei
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invoking issue preclusion under national law pursuant to Article III, may essentially
argue that the finding that underlay denial of enforcement in the first action is binding
on it, and on that basis either refuse to entertain the enforcement action or entertain it,
but deny enforcement on that basis.
The interesting question arises whether a court that relies, in denying enforce·
ment to a Convention award, on a determination by another country's court that an
award is subject to a Convention defense violates its obligation under the Convention
to determine the enforcement action independently. I would argue that refusing to
entertain an enforcement action on the basis that another court of secondary jurisdic·
tion found that a defens~ to enforcement was established would indeed represent an
abdication of res:_f,onsibility. There seems to be broad support for this proposition. 88 In
this regard, the Restatement, draws a distinction between (a) an annulment or denial
of confirmation of an award at the seat and (b) denial of enforcement of an award by
a court of a third jurisdiction. 8~ The former is entitled to preclusive, or presumptive
preclusive, effe'ct; but the-l:i:iter ,not, thereby reflecting the difference between determinations by a court of primary jurisdiction and a court of secondary jurisdiction. To
much the same effect is the case in the UK Supreme Court, where the court acknowl·
edged the possibility that issue estoppel in an enforcement action could result from a
prior determination by a court of the seat. 90 Deference to rulings by a court of the seat
under the law of the seat manifests ,itself in many ways. Thus, the High Court of
England and Wales recently denied enforcement on the ground that an Austrian court
had held that the award was not yet binding. 91 Similarly, the Brazilian lex arbitri
explicitly provides that courts may refuse to enforce foreign awards on the procedural
ground that the foreign award has not become res judicata in its COUJltry of origin.n
Conversely, courts have given preclusive effect to another court's finding that no
ground for denying enforcement was established. 93
88. See, e.g., Id., at 40; Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis, and Stefan Kroll, COMPARATIVE IITTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,, 26-105·26·ll0 (Kluwer Law International 2003).
89. Restatement§ 4.8, comment c(ili).
90. DaUah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company (Appellant) v. The Ministry of Religi.ous
Affairs, Government of Pakistan (Respondent) [2010] UKSC 46 198 (stating that "in some cases

a detennination by the court of the seat may give rise to an issue estoppel or other preclusive
effect in the court in which enforcement is sought").
91. Diag Human Se v. Czech Republic [2014] EWHC 1639 (Comm) 162 (May 22, 2014).
92. Lauro Gama Jr, and Bi:uno Teixeira,)nterpretation and Application of the N= York Convention
in Brazil, in Tim?!NTERPRETATIONAND Al>Pl.JCAT!ON OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION BY NATIONAL COURTS
160 (George Bermann, ed.) (New York, Springer International Publishing 2017).
93, See, e.g., Belmont Partners, LLC v. Mina Mar Group, Inc., 741 F.Supp.2d 743, 750-753 (2010)
(explicitly invoking Article III's procedural clause, confirming an award on the ground that an
Ontario court's confirmation of it, rejecting defenses to enforcement, had preclusive effect);
Coeclerid fl.sia ,(Pte) Ltd-v~;Gujdrat NP.£ Coke Limited [2013] FCA 882 11 102-103 (giving
preclusive•effect to an English court's refusal to set aside an arbitral award on the same ground
raised here, finding issue estoppel and probably also res judicata); Gulf Petro Trading Co., Inc.
v. Nigerian Nat. Petroleum Corp., 288 F.Supp.2d 783, 795 (recognizing as res judicata a Swiss
court's determination that an award was enforceable). But cf. Yukos v. Rosneff Capital [2012]
EWCA Civ 855
150-151, 157, in which an English court denied preclusive effect to a Dutch
court's determination that the award had been set aside at the seat only due to corrupt
proceedings, finding that the issue would have to be tried again, since it was a ground of public
policy, which is different in every country, that caused the Dutch court to disregard the setting

n
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Relatedly, it may be argued that a party that fails to seek annulment of an award
at the seat is foreclosed from raising in a subsequent enforcement action elsewhere a
ground that was available to it in an annulment action. In Hebei Import and Export
Corp. v. Polytek Engineering Co., 94 the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal left open the
possibility that, under some circumstances, failure to seek annulment in the jurisdiction in which the award was rendered could estop a party from seeking enforcement
elsewhere. The court found estoppel to be inappropriate, largely because the ground
being asserted was a violation of public policy and because public policy can vary
substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.95 The Court of Appeal for England and
Wales hinted, without deciding, that the Convention allows a court to recognize
enforcement of an award by a court in another jurisdiction as a basis for issue
estoppel. 96 It declined to do so, however, for the same reason as the court in Hebei.,
since the issue was one of public policy in the enforcing jurisdictions. 97 One commentator has drawn a distinction between using preclusion to grant enforcement and using
it to deny enforcement, since the former is supportive of the policy favoring enforcement, but the latter not. 98

[Fl

Set-off of Claims

It is not unlikely, given the complex and long-term commercial relations that typify
international commercial arbitration, that the defendant in an enforcement action will
assert a set-off. In some jurisdictions, notably common law, set-offs are viewed as a
procedural matter, 99 while in others, notably civil law, they are viewed as essentially
substantive. 100 Regardless of the preference, the generally prevailing view, largely
based on the civil law approach, is that set·off claims address neither how nor whether
an enforcement action is to be conducted, and thus fall outside the scope of Article III.
Reflective of this position are decisions rendered by courts in Ontario,1°1 Australia, 102
and the U.S. 103 Accordingly, a set-off should in principle be asserted at the merits stage

aside of the award in Russia. In any case, since the practice of recognizing a prior court's
determination that defenses to enforcement lack merit results in enforcement of awai:ds, not
denial of enforcement, it does not pose a threat to the Convention's enforcement scheme the way
the converse situation could.
94. Hebei Import and Export Corp. v. Polytek Engineering Co., Hong Kang, Court of Final Appeal,
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, FACV 10/1998, 36 (February 9, 1998).
95. Id.
96. Yukos v. Rosne~ Capital [2012] EWCA Civ 855 11 150-157.
97. Id., at 157.
98. Renato Nazzini, Enforcement of IntemationalArbitral Awards: Res JudicaJ.a, Issue Estoppel, and
Abuse of Process in a Transnational Context, 66 AM. J. CoMP. L. 603, 614-621 (2018).
99. Maxi Scherer, The Award and the Courts, Set-Off in International Arbitration, 455-456, in
AUSTRIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (C. Klausegger et al. eds.) (2015).
100. Id., at 454-455.
101. Abener Energia SA v. SunOpta Inc. [2010] ONCA 57.
102. Uganda Telecom Ltd v. Hi-Tech TelecomPty Ltd [2011] FCA 131.
103. Hewlett-Packard Co., Inc. v. Helge Berg, etc., et. al., 61 F.3d. 101, 105 (1st Cir. 1995).
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of an arbitration, not at the stage of enforcement of the resulting award. 104 An
exception may be made if an award has already been issued and, for one reason or
another, it could not be raised alongside the merits. 105
Interestingly, in Germany, although it is a civil law jurisdiction, the question of
set-offs has been approached through the lens of Article III, largely because it entails
the question of the proper stage at which to raise the matter, which is itself a procedural
determination.106 While certain regional courts, in the interest of the efficiency of the
enforcement procedure, disallowed set-offs, 107 others allowed them provided that the
set-off could not have been raised in the arbitral proceedings. 108 Finally deciding the
issue, the Federal Court of Justice, largely adopting the latter view, declared set-offs at
the enforcement-s,tage permissible where the reasons for them only surfaced after the
arbitral proceeding had ended, or where the set-off was raised but the arbitral tribunal
did not or could not decide the matter. 109 Similarly, the Austrian Supreme Court allows
respondents to assert set-off objections to resist the enforcement of arbitral awards if
the arbitral trjbun,al declined_Jqqmsider the defense. no As for the U.S., in Jugometal v.
Samincorp, the federal ilistrict court, taking into account a broad range of considerations, ruled that "[t]he interests of justice require that the Court exercise its powers
over the counterclaims, and strike a net balance, notwithstanding the fact that the
arbitral tribunal, because of its own procedures, was unable to do so. [... ] The
Convention does not prevent this Court from entertaining set-offs or counterclaims in
a proper case where authorized by Rule 13 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). "111
The relevant question for present purposes is whether, in cases where the
availability of a set-off is viewed as sufficiently procedural to be dealt with under
Article III, allo:wmg them to be raised in an enforcement action unduly prejudices the
purposes of the Convention. The only basis for viewing set-offs as such is that, as
certain German courts had held, their entertainment tends to complicate and lengthen
enforcement proceedings. However, the fact that entertaining them may not be ideal
from a Convention viewpoint does not necessarily mean that the result of doing so is
inimical to the Convention's purposes. Article III should not, accordingly, foreclose the
application of national law to bring a set-offs into an enforcement action.

104. Andreas Borner, Article m, 131, in RECOGNJTlON AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
(Kronke and Nacimiento eds., Kluwer, 2010).
105. Id., at 131.
.
106. Adolphsen, in Mi.iKO ZPO, .6rt: V UNU~para. 15.
107. BayObLG .NJW-RR 2001; 13°63 (Bavaria); OLG Stuttgart OLG Report 3/2001, 50.
108. OLG Koblenz SchiedsVZ 2005, 260.
109. BGH SchiedsVZ 2010, 330 - NJW-RR 2011, 213.
110. Scherer, supra n. 99, at 472, citing Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] September 12,
1951, docket No. 1 Ob 623/51, 24, No. 220.Comp; Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme
Court] March 29, 2006, docket No. 3 Ob 290/05; Oberster Gerichtshof (OGH] [Supreme Court]
May 15, 2012, docket No. 3 Ob 66/12w (Austria).]
111. Jugometal v. Samincorp, 78 F.R.D. 506-507 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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Sovereign Immunity

Although opinions differ, the prevailing view is that States do not, by ratifying the New
York Convention, waive their sovereign immunity to suit, in national court to the
extent they enjoy such immunity, m even where the suit seeks only enforcement of an
arbitration agreement or award, but that, by entering an agreement to arbitrate, they do
waive such immunity. m If this is so, then a State's assertion of sovereign immunity to
suit pursuant to Article III does not run afoul of the Convention's purposes. In other
words, Article III preserves sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional defense under
national law, to the extent it exists.
The possibility cannot be excluded, however, that a Contracting State's rules
governing sovereign immunity might be so absolute or so far-reaching as to be an
undue impediment to operation of the Convention. Depending on how it is framed in
any given jurisdiction, the restrictive theory of immunity~depriving States of immunity when acting in a sovereign capacity-should, however, mitigate potential difficulties.114 In the U.S., foreign sovereignty cannot fairly be regarded as going so far as to be
problematic.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") is important to consider in two
regards-providing jurisdiction over an action against a foreign State and-as a second
step-providing an immunity defense.
Regarding jurisdiction, the FSIA establishes that "a foreign state shall be inun une
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States" unless an
exception set out in the Act is satisfied. 115 In case an exception to immunity is pertinent
under the Act, the FSIA provides that federal courts have (non-exclusive) subject
matter jurisdiction "without regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil
action against a foreign state,"116 and that "[p]ersonal jurisdiction ... shall exist as to
every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection
(a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title. ~m If a case is filed in
state court against a foreign State it may be removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §
1441(d). Courts have concluded that the Act, if applicable, is the "sole basis for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court." 118
The FSIA provides jurisdiction in case one or more of the exceptions it provides
for are fulfilled. These exceptions to immunity open the door widely to enable
jurisdiction and enforcement actions against States. Only exceptionally will the FSIA's

112. SchiedsVZ 2006, 44/47; for a different view, see the application in Japan described in Hisashi
Harata, Interpretation and.Application of the New York Convention in Japan, 585,613, in THE
INTERPRETATION J\NIJ Af'PLICATION OF TIIE NEW Yoru< CONVENTION BY N/\.TIONJ\L COURTS (George
Bermann, ed.) (New York, Springer International Publishing 2017).
113. See, e.g., the Uoited Kingdom's State Immunity Act 1978, s. 9; the US Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §1605 (a) (6) (2012); Art. 17 of Act on the Civil Jurisdiction of Japan.
114. See Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property.
llS. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
116. Id., § 1330(a).
117. Id., § i330(b).
118. Samantar v. You.suf, 130 S.Ct. 2278, 2286 (2010); Argentine Republic v. Amerada.Hess Shipping
Corp., 109 S.Ct. 683, 685 (1989).
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commercial activity serve to override immunity, due to the requirement of a nexus with
the United States. 119 Considerably more promising are the FSIA's waiver120 and
arbitration exceptions. 121 If the relevant arbitration agreement or award exists, ordinarily "it satisfies the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction under the Convention and the FSIA:'' 122 Hovf;'i/~, i~ DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 123 the district
court stipulated that immunity from suit might still be applicable and American courts
might lack jurisdiction in cases in which the State itself is not party to the arbitration
agreement and the arbitration, and the State instrumentality whose conduct gave rise
to liability was sufficiently separate from the State.
U.S. law also recognizes sovereign immunity to execution. However, the New
York Convention and its Article Ill are not concerned with the execution of awards. It
lies beyond the scope of the present inquiry.

[H]

Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations determines the time limit for bringing a civil action, including
an action to enforce a Convention award. The New York Convention itself prescribes
no statute of limitations for such actions (though it surely could have done so), thus
necessarily inviting application of national law to that issue. The prescription period
therefore varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In the U.S., 9 U.S.C. § 207 provides
that "within three years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention is made,
any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under this
chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration. »m Timeline_s~ of an-action under any statute of limitations may in principle turn
on rules determinilig when a cause of action accrues, when suit is deemed brought, and
what tolling rules may apply.125 These too are subject to national law.
The only imaginable scenario in which the Convention would be offended by
application under Article III of a' statute of limitations supplied by national law is one
119. See Samantar v. You.suf, U.S.2010, 130 S.Ct. 2278, 2285 (2010); cf. for Sweden Sedelmayer v.
The Ru.ssian Federation, decided July 1, 2011, Case Cl 170-10 discussing when a property is
deemed to be used for State's official purposes and pointing to the Convention on the
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property as largely a codification of costmary law;
see, regarding the purpose of assets and their usage under German law, Kammergericht Berlin,
ScbiedsVZ 2007, 108, 111. However, in China, sovereign immunity appears to be absolute.
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates LLC (No. 1), 14 HKCFAR 95
(2011).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 160S(a)(l).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 160S(a}(6). SeeCreightonLtd. v. Gov'tofStateofQatar, 181 F.3d 118, 123-124 (D.C.
Cir. 1999); U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzlwu Zhen Hua Shipping Co., Ltd., 241 F.3d 135, 151 (2d
Cir. 2001).
122. Cargill Int'l S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012, 1018 (2d Cir. 1993).
123. 71 F.Supp.3d 201 (D.D.C. 2014); distinguished by Gretton Limited v. Republic of Uzbekistan,
2019 WL 3430669.
124. U.S. Code §207.
125. See, e.g., Seetran.sport Wiking Trader Schifffah.rtsgesellicha.~ MBH & Co., Kommo.ruiitgesell•
sch.a~ v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 989 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a cause of action
to enforce a Convention award accrues when the award is issued and was not tolled by virtue
of a litigation over the award in a court of the seat).
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in which the applicable limitations period was so egregiously short as to make the
bringing of an enforcement action unreasonably difficult. There is no known case so

finding.
[I]

Damages

The type and quantum of damages awarded in an arbitration seldom raise Article III
difficulties. In the first place, in the great majority of legal systems, damages-and
remedies more generally-are conceived of as a substantive matter.126 More importantly, if damages are to be awarded in an enforcement action, their grant, including
their type and amount, will have been determined by the arbitral tribunal. As a merits
question, it will not ordinarily be open to discussion before the enforcement court.
Thus, even if damages are in some systems, like the U.S.,12 7 largely viewed as
procedural in nature, their consideration falls outside of the scope of Article III.
Even so, a question of the enforceability of a damages remedy, though awarded
by the tribunal, may possibly arise in the enforcing court. The classic example is
punitive damages, the award of which may be regarded as contrary to public policy in
the State where enforcement of the award is sought It is difficult to see why a court in
a State holding that view would not be entitled to refuse an award of punitive damages
by invoking the Convention's public policy defense. Thus, a court that chooses to do so
would not invoke Article Ill by definition, but rather Article V, viewing the matter as
having a substantive character and partaking of the merits.

[Jl

Currency and Interest

Ordinarily an arbitral award will designate the applicable rate of interest, whether
pre-award or post-award. Only in the rarest of cases-perhaps an award of interest
viewed as usurious under the public policy of the enforcing court-would an Article III
issue ever arise. In this circumstance, the question of interest will have been finally
decided. 128 In the truly exceptional case in which a rate of interest-or the date from
which it starts running-is not specified, the enforcing court is apt to make that
determination under forum law. u 9
More likely to arise are issues of the currency in which the award is to be paid.
While an award may have been rendered in one currency, the enforcing court may
126. Peter Ashford, fu.NDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 357-358 (2d ed., Oxford,
2014); John A. Trenor, Guide to Damages in International Arbitration, Connellan, Oger-Gross,
Andre, Clark, Compensatory Damages Prindple in a.ml and Common La.111 Jurisdictions, 2, in
Gumc TO DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (John A Trenor, ed.) (London, Law Business
Research).
127, Born, supra n. 3, at 2670; Compare Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws §207 (1971).
128. q, Borner, supra n. 104, at 129.
129. See, e.g., Waterside Ocean Navigation Co., Inc. v. International Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d 150,
153-154 (2d Cir. 1984); Albert Jan van den Berg, CONSOLIDATED COMMENTARY CASES REl>ORTED IN
VOLUMES XX] (1997)-XX.Vll (2002), in YCA XXVIII (2003), 645; Belize SOc. Dev. Ltd. v. Gov't of
Belize, SF. Supp. 3d 25, 43 (D.D.C. 2013), aff'd, 794 F.3d 99 (D.C. Cir. 2015); OLG Koblenz,
SchiedsVZ 2005, 260.
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consider itself disabled from issuing a judgment of enforcement in anything but local
currency. Whether viewed as procedural or not, and whether strictly addressed by
Article III or not, currency conversion will be performed under the national law of the
enforcing StateY0
The steps just described are steps that by their nature are taken in order to make
an award, as rendered, susceptible of enforcement, and enforcement in full. To that
extent, a court's taking those steps cannot possibly be perceived as inimical to
Convention purposes. One could conceivably come up with a scenario in which
application of national law under Article III on these issues under Article III could be
rejected as impeding operation of the Convention, as when a court applies a truly
derisory exchange rate. Resorting to national law should in principle be no more
objectionable than consulting national law under Article III to determine that enforcement of an award requires clarification or supplementation, resulting in a remand to
the tribunal. 131
§4.03

CONCLUSION

The preceding .di!lcussion _ha_ll, far from exhausted the issues on which Article III may
bear. An isJue having a:-pfi'tatively procedural character may or may not even fall
within the scope of Article III because not viewed as procedural for those purposes.
More intriguingly, questions can, with variable ease, be imagined in which application
of national law under Article III would lead to results arguably incompatible with the
Convention's purposes.
It is unsurprising that the drafters did not set out to unify the rules governing the
procedure by which enforcement of awards under the New York Convention were to be
conducted. First of all, it would be an impossible task. There are countless procedural
aspects to the enforcement of Convention awards in national court, and harmonizing
national law on them all would be all but impossible. But beyond that, it would be
unworkable and, in fact, unreasonable from the Contracting States' point of view to
carve away actions to enforce Convention awards from the universe of civil actions and
subject them to sui generis procedural rules applicable to those actions, and those
actions alone.
This is not to say that there are no discrete procedural issues that the drafters
could readily have addressed without disturbance of national court systems. Perhaps
the best example is specification of a uniform statute of limitations applicable to
enforcement actions and possibly even the rules governing its application. But doing so
would not obviate the need for an Article III, thanks to the multitudinous other
procedural issue.s one qm expect to arise in connection with enforcement proceedings.
Lack of procedural uniformity across jurisdictions in the enforcement of awards is the
inescapable price.
130. Borner, fU.Pra, ;n. 104,_.at,)2.9,:citing.,Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Judicial
Collegiuin /(decided May-22, 1997), YCA XXV (2000), 641 (at 760) (Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation, Judicial Collegium).
131. Id.
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That said, determining what matters are to be treated as procedural within the
meaning is not invariably a simple task. To be sure, there is little doubt that Article Ill
applies to some of the matters discussed above. These includes statute of limitations
and even claim and issue preclusion. But there are others. Forum non conveniens may
perhaps be excluded from the scope of Article III on the ground that it determines not
how, but whether, enforcement proceedings will be conducted. But that rationale
would also then require courts to suspend their usual rules of personal jurisdiction
because the action before them happens to be an action for enforcement of an arbitral
award, and they may be unwilling or unable to do so. There are ways of mitigating the
Article III challenges. One that has arisen in more than one place in the discussion is to
treat the issue as fundamentally a substantive one and for determination solely by the
arbitral tribunal, whose determination on that issue is for national courts to respect and
enforce.
Fortunately, the situations in which achievement of the Convention's purposes
cannot tolerate application of the enforcing court's procedural norms under Article III
are exceptionally rare. To that extent. Article ill may be viewed as operating remarkably well. However, the possibility cannot be excluded that a difficult outlier situation
will arise. Even for matters that squarely fall within the ambit of Article III, scenarios
can with some difficulty be imagined in which application of national law would be
inimical to achievement of the Convention's purposes. Happily, such scenarios are in
most cases highly improbable. Surely, each issue to which Article III potentially has
application must be taken on its own term. The questions whether an issue belongs in
Article III, whatever the reason may be why it does not, and whatever the outer limits
of freedom of national law to address it, are plainly approachable only on an
issue-by-issue basis.
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